21. The Oliver court explained that while “Congress ha[d] progressively expanded the reach of § 523(a)(8)” with BAPCPA to exclude more student loans from discharge, it had not added the language of § 523(a)(8)(B) simply to exclude from discharge any and every debt with a connection to education, regardless of how tenuous the connection might be. Id. at 623. Id. Oliver gives weight to the retention of these six words post-BAPCPA and says courts cannot simply jump to the definition of § 221(d)(1) in deciding if a debt is nondischargeable. Id. at 622-23. The Oliver court expounded:
So it court is tough-pushed to track down a case that means what sets new “educational” character regarding a loan under § 523(a)(8)(B)
“[A]ny most other instructional financing” is a beneficial “set,” as well as every sort of money which can slip thereunder, precisely the “subset” out of “qualified degree money” falls inside exemption to release. Said one other way, discover a two-tiered study: basic, if an obligations try an educational “loan” and, if it is, after that if this suits the internal Cash Code concept of “qualified education loan.”
Happening legislation examining “educational” financing not as much as § 523(a)(8) generally examines exactly how youngsters invest financing money or analyzes consolidation finance, wanted by individuals, assured out-of securing most readily useful financing terms otherwise cost
22. Here, the Jubers argue that § 523(a)(8)(B) and § https://servicecashadvance.com/payday-loans-va/luray/ 221(d) apply to the Oral Loan because it was indebtedness used to refinance a qualified education loan pursuant to § 221(d). The Jubers focus on the fact that their extension of credit to the Debtor appears to meet the § 221(d) requirements. The court, however, does not need to decide if the Oral Loan was a refinance of the Three Original Loans if the Oral Loan, itself, does not overcome the threshold language of § 523(a)(8)(B) as outlined by the Oliver court.
23. The issue of whether the Oral Loan is an “educational loan” is, in and of itself, a two-part question: Was this a loan, and if so, was it an “educational” loan? Select Alibatya v. Ny College or university (Into the re Alibatya), 178 B.R. 335, 338 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (“The term ‘educational’ is merely an adjective describing ‘loan.’ “). The Bankruptcy Code does not include a definition of an “educational loan.” Gorosh v. Posner (In the re Posner), 434 B.R. 800, 803 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010). The parties do not dispute that the funds provided by the Jubers to pay off the Three Original Loans constituted a loan. Therefore, the pertinent issue is whether the loan was educational in character and nature. “[T]he character of a loan should dictate how it is treated.” Joined Student Assistance Money v. Flint (In lso are Flint), 238 B.R. 676, 680 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (citing Santa Fe Med. Servs., Inc. v. Segal (In the re also Segal), 57 F.3d 342, 349 (3d Cir. 1995)); get a hold of Lapusan v. Educ. Borrowing Mgmt. Corp. (In the re also Lapusan), 244 B.R. 423, 424 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2000) (citing Flint, 238 B.R. at 680-81); George Arizona Univ. v. Pelzman (In the re also Pelzman), 233 B.R. 575, 580 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1999) (recognizing that a loan was an educational loan when it was “intended to allow the debtor to meet those expenses incidental to her obtaining an education” and was “plainly designed to facilitate the debtor’s education”).
24. The nature of funds advanced to students is usually challenged under § 523(a)(8)(A), not § 523(a)(8)(B). See, e.g., Busson-Sokolik v. Milwaukee College away from Eng’g (In the lso are Sokolik), 635 F.3d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 2011); Brownish v. Corrosion (Inside the re Corrosion) 510 B.R. 562, 567 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2014). See generally Dufrane v. Navient Sols., Inc. (Inside lso are Dufrane), 566 B.R. 28, 36-39 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2017). This case is different.